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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Corporations-Compensation of Officers-Attacks by
Minority Stockholders
In a recent case1 decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the plaintiff, owner of non-voting, cumulative preferred
stock brought a derivative action attacking the compensation paid by the
corporation to its officers. The plaintiff alleged suppression of divi-
dends, excessive salaries and bonuses, and fraudulent conversion of cor-
'Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F. 2d 52 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
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porate assets by the directors who were also the officers of the
corporation and owned all its common stock. The judgment of the
lower court holding the compensation reasonable and denying the plain-
tiff's prayer for an accounting was affirmed, except as to bonuses
awarded retroactively. As to these, a retrial was ordered.
Attacks by minority stockholders against the compensation 2 paid cor-
porate executives reached a peak following the "booming twenties."
With corporate profits currently reaching an all-time high, and with
this tendency correspondingly characteristic of executive compensation,
such- attacks may again become prominent. An inquiry into the situa-
tions in which courts of equity will review3 remuneration received by
corporate officers at the instance of minority stockholders would seem
appropriate. Generally, these may be divided into three categories:
(1) where excessiveness or unreasonableness of compensation alone is
the primary complaint; (2) where excessiveness is coupled with bad
faith; (3) where payment of the compensation is not authorized by
charter, by-law, statute or agreement.
The proposition governing the fixing of executive compensation may
be generally stated: compensation must be reasonably related to the
value of the services rendered.4
The same general principles are applicable to both salaries and bonuses and
"compensation" as used herein denotes both. "Salary" refers to fixed or flat-rate
compensation; bonus embraces incentive compensation derived from some type of
profit-sharing plan. The more usual incentive compensation plans provide pay-
ment in stock options, stock, pensions, annuities or cash.
The liability of independent corporation directors, as such, for payment of ex-
cessive salaries to officers is beyond the scope of this discussion. For a discussion
of the protection afforded directors by the "business judgment" rule see Carson,
Current Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 40 MicH. L. REv. 1125
(1942).
'Relief may take the form of an accounting, injunction, receivership or in ex-
treme cases dissolution.
' Rogers v. Hill, 298 U. S. 582 (1933), reversing 60 F. 2d 109 (C. C. A. 2d
1932); 28 ILL. L. REV. 712 (1934); 17 MINN. L. REV. 433 (1933); 42 YALE L. J.
419 (1933); Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E. D.
Pa. 1943), modified 53 F. Supp. 488, Comment 32 CALIF. L. REv. 88 (1944);
Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F. 2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924); Wight v. Heublein, 238
Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 4th 1916); Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co., 70 N. J. Eq.
197, 56 Atl. 254 (1903) ; Baker v. Cohn, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 159 (1942), modified 40
N. Y. S. 2d 623, 292 N. Y. 570 (1944) ; Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 153
App. Div. 697, 139 N. Y. Supp. 236, 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914) (com-
pensation may not be a mere incident of the office) ; Carr v. Kimball, 153 App.
Div. 825, 139 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1912); Stratis v. Andreson, 254 Mass. 536, 150
N. E. 832 (1926) (where several positions are held, although aggregate compen-
sation may not be excessive, compensation for each office must also be reasonable) ;
Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 189 N. W. 586 (1922);
7 'MI NN. L. REv. 347 (1923) ; Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Co., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W.
593 (1925) ; Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., 139 Wash. 305, 246 Pac. 941 (1926)
(value of services cannot be predicated on holding of stock in corporation) ; Hurt
v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F. 2d 52 (C. C. A. 5th 1947) (fact profit
would be taken for taxes if not paid in compensation is no justification). See
Notes, 27 A. L. R. 305 (1923) ; 44 A. L. R. 570 (1926). See Baker, A Just Gauge
for Executive Compensation, 22 HARv. Bus. REv. 75 (1943).
Myers v. Ft. Hill Engraving Co., 249 Mass. 302, 143 N. E. 915 (1924).
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The question of the reasonableness of compensation is one of fact5
and the circumstances of each case must necessarily govern. While no
one factor is determinative, courts have laid particular stress upon one
or more in reaching a decision. Thus the time and effort devoted by
the officer to the corporation affairs has an important bearing ;" likewise,
the character and extent of services rendered is pertinent.7  The com-
pensation previously paid,8 and the compensation of executives in sim-
ilar positions in competing corporations 9 have also been considered. The
personal attributes and ability of the particular executive involved re-
ceive particular attention.10 Factors germane to the status of the cor-
poration itself may also be applicable. The relation of compensation to
the profits made and dividends paid" and the relative bearing of the
efforts of the executive to the success of the corporation' 2 merit consid-
eration. What effect does ratification of the compensation by the stock-
holders have upon the court's consideration of the subject? Under the
doctrine of Rogers v. Hill,'3 where the court said that unreasonable
compensation was waste and the majority had no power to make a gift
of corporate property or authorize waste over the protests of a minority,
it apparently has no effect as to the right of the minority to a review by
equity. But in later litigation 14 involving some of the same executives,
* Blancard v. Blancard & Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 264, 125 Atl. 337 (1924) ; Atwater v.
Elkhorn Valley Coal-Land Co., 184 App. Div. 253, 171 N. Y. Supp. 552 (1918),
aff'd, 227 N. Y. 611, 125 N. E. 912 (1919); Collins v. Hite, 109 W. Va. 79, 153
S. E. 240 (1930).
'Francis v. Brigham-Hopkins Co., 108 Md. 233, 70 Atl. 95 (1908) (president
had sole charge of all business and financial policies); Koplar v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1937) (personal services and financial
assistance rendered corporation); Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.
2d 52 (C. C. A. 5th 1947) (officers personally endorsed corporation obligations).
'Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co:, 70 N. J. Eq. 197, 56 Atl. 254 (1903);
Raynolds v. Diamond Mills Paper Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 299, 60 Atl. 941 (1905).
'Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960 (S. D. N. Y. 1942);
Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1937). But what
officer might make in a different business could not be considered. Lillard v.
Oil, Paint & Drug Co., supra note 8.
" McQuillen v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 112 F. 2d 877 (C. C. A. 4th 1940),
certiorari denied, 311 U. S. 729 (1940); Diamond v. Davis, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 181
(1945); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 653 (19.41), aff'd, 32 N. Y. S. 2d131/.(1941).
,W Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F. 2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924); Wight v. Heublein,
238 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 4th 1916); Raynolds v. Diamond Mill Paper Co., 69
N. J. Eq. 299, 60 Atl. 941 (1905).
" Pouch v. Nat'l Foundry & Machine Co., 147 Ky. 243, 143 S. W. 1003 (1912);
Luyckx v. Aylward Coal Co., 270 Mich. 468, 259 N. W. 135 (1935); Heller v.
Boylan, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 653 (1941), aff'd, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 131 (1941). But
see Raynolds v. Diamond Mill Paper Co., supra note 11, where court said success
of corporation was measured by what the stockholders received and mere accu-
mulation of assets by the directors would not justify large compensation.
It should be noted that success may be a false standard when corporation is
struggling and in bad condition since it is here that greatest effort and most val-
uable services may be rendered by the officers and directors.
12298 U. S. 582 (1933).
' Heller v. Boylan, 29 N. Y. S. 2d 653 (1941), aft'd, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 131
(1941) ; accord, Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del.
1937) ; Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Co., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W. 593 (1925).
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the New York court said ratification by disinterested majority after full
disclosure 5 could be considered significant as bearing on the "equities"
of the case. It would seem, then, that ratification of the majority, per
se, should have no bearing on the right of the minority to "their day
in court"; but it may have considerable weight in determining the ques-
tion of reasonableness.
It is often said that the court will not act as the general manager
of the corporation or assume regulation of its business; and if the
directors, without adverse interest to the stockholders, act in good faith
in fixing compensation of the officers their judgment will not be dis-
turbed."6 While the amount of the compensation may be so large as to
justify an inquiry by equity to determine if misuse or waste is present,
the burden of proving that it is clearly oppressive or wasteful remains
upon the attacking minority1 7 The courts feel the lack of any clear
standard of reasonableness by which to judge the questioned remunera-
tion, and the result is that a clear showing of oppression or waste is
required before the courts will substitute their judgment for that of the
directors. The distinction between waste and mere excessiveness is
aptly put by District Judge Coleman in the McQuillen case:
"We must distinguish between compensation that is actually
wasteful and that which is merely excessive. The former is un-
lawful, the latter is not. The former is the result of a failure
"Full and complete disclosure of all aspects of the compensation plan is neces-
sary if ratification by the disinterested majority is to be afforded any weight in
determination of reasonableness. Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp.
960 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 108 N. J. Eq. 148,
154 Atl. 321 (1931). For a discussion of the extent to which disclosure is com-
pelled by regulations of the S. E. C. and other governmental agencies, see Gco. T.
Washington, The Corporation Executive's Living Wage, 54 HARV. L. REv. 733,
764 (1941).
" "In determining whether salaries are excessive and unreasonable so that there
should be a restoration courts proceed with some caution. An intolerable con-
dition might result if the courts should too lightly undertake the fixing of salaries
at the suit of dissatisfied stockholders. An issue as to the reasonable value of the
services of officers is easily made. It is not intended that courts shall be called
upon to make a yearly audit and adjust salaries. The dissenting stockholder
should come into court with proof of wrongdoing or oppression and should have
more than a claim based on mere differences of opinion upon the question whether
equal services could have been procured for somewhat less." Seitz v. Union Brass
& Metal Mfg. Co., 152 Minn. 460, 464, 189 N. W. 586, 587 (1922); Poutch v.
Nat'l Foundry & Machine Co., 147 Ky. 242, 143 S. W. 1003 (1912) (must be fraud
before court will interfere) ; Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Co., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W.
593 (1925); Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp., 69 N. E. 2d 396 (C. P. Ohio
1946) ; cf. Bates St. Shirt Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 352, 156 Atl. 293 (1931).
1? Rogers v. Hill, 298 U. S. 582 (1933) (salary and bonuses of president of
American Tobacco Co. amounted to $842,507.72 in one year) ; Heller v. Boylan,
29 N. Y. S. 2d 653, aff'd, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 131 (1941) (salary and bonus of
same official as in Rogers case had been reduced to approximately $400,000 a
year) ; Gallin v. Nat'l City Bank, 152 Misc. 679, 273 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1934) (salary
and bonuses of president amounted to $1,417,149.72 for one year. Court said no
inference of fraud or oppression arose but inquiry was merely to ascertain if same
were present).
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to relate the amount of compensation to the needs of the par-
ticular situation by any recognized business practices, honestly,
even though unwisely adopted; namely, the result of bad faith,
or a total neglect of or indifference to such practices. Excessive
compensation results from poor judgment, not necessarily from
anything else."18
The result of this attitude by the courts is an overwhelming majority
of cases upholding the compensation and mffirming the judgment of
independent directors. 19
Where fraud or bad faith is evidenced, the reluctance of courts of
equity to interfere in the internal affairs of corporations is overcome.20
Thus, where a fraudulent scheme to absorb the profits of the corpora-
tions appears or where there is willful oppression of the rights of the
minority, as for example, an attempt to "freeze out" a minority holder,
appropriate relief is afforded.2 1 Where directors are also officers and
participated in fixing their own compensation; i.e., where there is "self-
dealing," most courts feel this alone is enough to justify a review by
equity of the reasonableness of the questioned compensation.22  Because
18McQuillen v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 653 (1939), aff'd,
112 F. 2d 877 (C. C. A. 4th 1940), certiorari denied, 311 U. S. 729 (1940).
" See Geo. T. Washington, The Corporation Executive's Living Wage, 54
H.-v. L. REv. 733 (1941).
"
0Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E. D. Ky. 1939),
aff'd, 127 F. 2d 291 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 639 (1942); Balch v. In-
vestor's Royalty Co., 7 F. Supp. 420 (N. D. Okla. 1934); Church v. Harnet, 35
F. 2d 499 (C. C. A. 6th 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 732 (1929); Wight v.
Heublein, 238 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 4th 1916); Beha v. Martin, 161 Ky. 838, 171
S. W. 393 (1914) ; Mathews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 Atl. 645
(1917) ; Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 197, 56 Atl. 254 (1903);
Booth v. Beattie, 95 N. J. Eq. 776, 118 Ati. 257 (1922), aff'd, 123 Atl. 925 (1924);
Carr v. Kimball, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1912); Neff v. 20th
Century Silk Corp., 312 Pa. 386, 167 AtI. 578 (1933). But cf. Luyckx v. R. L.
Aylward Coal Co., 270 Mich. 468, 259 N. W. 135 (1935).
2 Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F. 2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924) (where directors
sought to absorb all profits); Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 So. 516
(1927) (where excessive compensation 'was part of scheme for fraudulent sup-
pression of dividends); Miller v. Crown Perfumery Co., 57 Misc. 383, 109 N. Y.
Supp. 760 (1908) (where board sought to absorb profits through compensation,
plaintiff having refused to sell his stock) ; Carr v. Kimball, supra note 20 (where
officers gained working control and sought to exclude plaintiff from all profits and
knowledge of corporate affairs); Eaton v. Robinson, 19 R. I. 146, 31 Atl. 1058
(1895) (where salaries were fixed to deprive plaintiffs of dividends on their mort-
gaged stock in event they obtained right to redeem); Newcomer v. Mountain
States Ice & Cold Storage Co., 63 S. D. 81, 256 N. W. 359 (1934) (where de-
fendant directors, engaged in competing business, had bought into control of defend-
ant corporation and compensation part of plan to ruin business).2 Wight v. Heublein, 238 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 4th 1916); Booth v. Beattie, 95
N. J. Eq. 776, 118 AtI. 257 (1922), aff'd, 123 AtI. 925 (1924); Lillard v. Oil,
Paint & Drug Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 197, 56 AtI. 254 (1903); Davis v. Thomas A.
Davis Co., 63 N. J. Eq. 572, 52 Att. 717 (1902) ; Francis v. Brigham-Hopkins Co.,
108 Md. 233, 70 Atl. 95 (1908) ; Sagalyn v. Meekins, 290 Mass. 434, 195 N. E.
769 (1935); Carr v. Kimble, 153 App. Div. 825, 139 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1912);
Collins v. Hite, 109 W. Va. 79, 153 S. E. 240 (1930); Beha v. Martin, 161 Ky.
838, 171 S. W. 393 (1914). But cf. Bates Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 392,
156 At. 293 (1931).
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of the fiduciary relationship existing between the directors or officers
and the stockholders, some courts take the position that self-dealing
imposes the burden of establishing the fairness and reasonableness of
the compensation upon the interested director, or that bad faith is
presumed.23
May such transactions of interested directors be ratified by the stock-
holders; and if so, what is the effect? Where the interested director
voted for the compensation-fixing resolution, or his presence was neces-
sary to a quorum, the minority view holds such resolutions or contracts
to be void ;24 and it follows that there can be no ratification. The pre-
vailing view, however, is that they are merely voidable at the instance
of the corporation or minority stockholders. 25 If there is a full, free
and frank disclosure, ratification by a disinterested majority has been
held convincing proof of the reasonableness of the compensation and is
usually binding on the minority.26 It would seem, then that the burden
of justifying the compensation as reasonable would be lifted from the
interested director and the dissentor would be called upon to justify
review by the courts through a showing of unreasonableness or oppres-
sion.2 7  While decisions have emphasized that there is no fiduciary
relationship between stockholders and the corporation and that directors
may vote their stock freely as stockholders,28 it should not follow that
they may effectively affirm their acts of self-dealing through ownership
of a majority of stock.P
" Church v. Harnit, 35 F. 2d 499 (C. C. A. 6th 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S.
732 (1929) ; Francis v. Brigham-Hopkins Co., supra note 22; Blancard v. Blan-
card & Co., 96 N. 3. Eq. 264, 125 Adt. 337 (1924). Bad faith presumed: Schall v.
Althaus, 208 App. Div. 103, 203 N. Y. Supp. 36 (1924) ; Davids v. Davids, 135
App. Div. 206, 120 N. Y. Supp. 350 (1909).
"Voorhees v. Mason, 245 Ill. 256, 91 N. E. 1056 (1910) ; McKey v. Swenson,
232 Mich. 505, 205 N. W. 583 (1925) ; Newcomer v. Mountain Springs Ice & Cold
Storage Co., 63 S. D. 81, 256 N. W. 359 (1934); Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala.
486, 113 So. 516 (1927) semble; Fields v. Victor Bldg. & Loan Co., 73 Okla. 207,
175 Pac. 529 (1918) semble.
2 Church v. Harnit, 35 F. 2d 499 (C. C. A. 6th 1929), cert. denied, 281
U. S. 732 (1929); Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 Ad. 224 (1921);
Mathews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 At. 645 (1917) ; Francis v.
Brigham-Hopkins Co., 108 Md. 233, 70 Ad. 95 (1908); Lillard v. Oil, Paint &
Drug Co., 70 N. 3. Eq. 197, 56 At. 254 (1903) ; Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co.,
153 App. Div. 697, 139 N. Y. Supp. 236. 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914);
Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232 Pa. 113, 81 At. 136 (1911). But see
Wood v. Myers Paper Co., 3 Tenn. App. 128 (1926).
" Diamond v. Davis, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 181 (1945); Putnam V. juvenile Shoe
Co., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S. W. 593 (1925) (where ratification effected after institu-
tion of suit by minority); Beha v. Martin, 161 Ky. 838, 171 S. W. 393 (1.924)
semble; cf. Bates Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, 130 Me. 352, 156 AtI. 293 (1931).
"See Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 197, 208, 56 AtI. 254,
258 (1903).
"Lillard v. Oil, Paint & Drug Co., supra note 27: Sotter v. Coatesville Boiler
Works, 257 Pa. 411, 101 At. 744 (1917); Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co., 232
Pa. 113, 81 AtI. 136 (1911).
" Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F. 2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924); Godley v. Crandall
& Godley Co., 153 App. Div. 697, 139 N. Y. Supp. 236, 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E.
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Where the payment is unauthorized* the right of recovery is clear.30
It is a well-settled principle that directors and managing officers are not
entitled to compensation for ordinary and usual services incident to their
office in the absence of charter provision, by-law, or statute authorizing
payment or in the absence of express agreement.3 ' The underlying
concept is that, directors and managing officers occupying a fiduciary
relation to the corporation and stockholders, no promise to pay will be
implied. There is an increasing tendency, however, to allow the reason-
able value of the services rendered when it is shown that the services
were in fact valuable and circumstances raise a fair presumption that
payment was expected and intended.32 Where compensation has been
fixed by charter, by-law, resolution or agreement, additional compen-
sation may not be granted retroactively.33 Retroactive compensation is
without consideration and a gift, and as such constitutes a waste of
corporate property. Such payment being wrongful, it may be recovered
by the corporation or by the stockholders in a derivative action.3 4 Since
payment may originally be authorized by the stockholders, it would seem
that ratification by them would cure any defect or lack of authority of
the directors and preclude an attack upon this ground. It has been
held, however, that the majority has no power to ratify waste or a
gift over the protest of the minority and in oppression of their rights,35
and a ratification by less than all would be ineffective.
818 (1914) ; Holdridge v. Lloyd Garritson Co., 163 Wash. 1, 299 Pac. 657 (1931) ;
cf. Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co, 159 F. 2d 52 (C. C. A. 5th 1947);
see Camden Land Co. v. Lewis, 101 Me. 78, 101, 63 AtI. 523, 533 (1905) (ratifica-
tion by interested directors as stockholders not effective where action sought to be
ratified leads to inference that interests of the directors were foreign and hostile to
the corporation) ; Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N. Y. 91, 99, 25 N. E.
201, 202 (1890) (ratification not effective if evidence raises inference of bad
faith).
"'Actions involving the computation of bonuses, while essentially questions of
accounting, proceed on the theory of lack of authority for payment.
"15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPoRATioNs §2109 (perm. ed. 1931); 3 THoMP-
SON, CoRPoRATioNs §1841 (1927); 19 C. J. S. Corporations, §803 (1940).
But where special, unusual 'or extraordinary services are rendered, an implied
promise to pay will be found. 5 FLETCHER, op. cit. §2114; 3 THOMPSON, op. cit.
§1853.
It is the general practice for charter or by-laws of the corporation to provide
for nominal fees for attendance of the directors at meetings. Note 32 'IrcH. L.
Rav. 672 (1934).
" Church v. Hamit, 35 F. 2d 499 (C. C. A. 4th 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S.
732 (1929) ; cf. Rowland v. Demming Exploration Co., Trustees, 45 Idaho 99, 260
Pac. 579 (1919).
"3 Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F. 2d 52 (C. C. A. 5th 1947) ; God-
Icy v. Crandall & Godley Co., 153 App. Div. 697, 139 N. Y. Supp. 236, 212 N. Y.
121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914); Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp., 69 N. E. 2d 396(C. Pl. Ohio 1946).
" See note 33 supra.
"Collins v. Hite, 109 W. Va. 79, 153 S. E. 240 (1930) ; cf Rogers v. Hill, 298
U. S. 582 (1933) ; Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F. 2d 52 (C. C. A.
5th 1947).
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It is to be noted then that excessiveness standing alone will rarely
afford relief. The courts feel justified in interfering in the internal
affairs of corporations only when there is bad faith or lack of authority
for the remuneration. It is submitted that the principle case accords
with this view.
AUGUsT L. MEYLAND, JR.
Declaratory Judgment-Challenging Restrictive and Regulatory
Statutes-Requirement of a Specific Threat of Enforcement
to Justiciability
Certain individual civil service employees and the United Public
Workers of America sought an injunction against members of the Civil
Service Commission to restrain them from enforcing against petitioners
the provisions of the second sentence of §9(a) of the Hatch Act' and
a declaratory judgment that this sentence was unconstittitional. The
sentence reads, "No officer or employee in the executive branch of the
Federal Government ... shall take any active part in political manage-
ment or in political campaigns." Only one of the employees had actually
violated the provisions of the Act challenged. The others filed affidavits
in support of their complaint in which they expressed a desire to engage
in specified political activities which they understood were forbidden by
the challenged sentence. Held, that the latter had not made out a
justiciable case or controversy on which to grant the relief prayed for.2
Only six justices out of seven3 sitting on the case made a direct pro-
nouncement on this particular point, four 4 holding no justiciable case
or controversy, two5 holding that there was." The majority found no
actual interference with petitioners' rights, and only a hypothetical threat
'53 STAT. 1148 (1939), as amended, 18 U. S. C. A. §61h(a) (Supp. 1946).
2 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, - U. S. - , 67 Sup. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed.
(Adv. Ops.) 509 (1947).
An adjudication on the merits, declaring the challenged sentence constitutional,
was had in this case, all the justices finding a justiciable case presented by the
employee who had actually violated the challenged sentence. On the merits the
decision was four to three, Justices Rutledge and Douglas dissenting because of
the particular status of the violating employee, that of an industrial worker, and
Justice Black on the grounds that the challenged provision was unconstitutional
on its face.3 Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case. -Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred with the majority
on the merits, but thought that the case should be dismissed as to all the petition-
ers for want of jurisdiction on another procedural basis.
'Justices Reed, Rutledge, Vinson, and Burton.
'Justices Black and Douglas.
'Although injunctive as well as declaratory relief was prayed for, consideration
of justiciability seems to have been confined to the prerequisites for declaratory
relief as presenting the minimum requirements. Therefore this note is also confined
to that area. For an exhaustive analysis of the point under consideration see Bor-
chard, Challenging "Penal" Statutes by Declaratory Action, 52 YALE L. J. 445
(1943) ; and Note, 50 YALE L. J. 1278 (1941).
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